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Note
Sharing Debts: Creditors and Debtors Under the
Uniform Marital Property Act
Two car dealers go to the home of a married couple to at-
tempt to sell them a truck.' They talk with both spouses. The
wife objects to the purchase, saying, among other things, that
she does not want to jeopardize their farm as a result of the
added debt. She refuses to take part in the purchase and the
dealers leave without making a sale. Later, however, the hus-
band goes to the car dealership and eventually purchases the
truck. The purchase is financed through promissory notes
signed by the husband, who defaults as the notes become due.
The corporation brings suit against the couple, and the court
holds that both spouses' marital property is liable for the debt,
despite the wife's objections to the purchase.2 The Uniform
Marital Property Act (UMPA) would make this result the law
in the forty-two common law states.3
The UMPA, published in the fall of 1983 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, com-
bines principles of community property law and common law
to create a new marital property regime. The Act proposes sev-
eral significant changes in the property relations between
spouses in common law jurisdictions,4 among the most note-
1. This scenario is based on Bellingham Motors Corp. v. Lindberg. 126
Wash. 684, 219 P. 19 (1923).
2. The Washington Supreme Court held that the wife's objections were
insufficient to sustain the defense that the agreement between the husband
and the corporation made the husband individually liable. Id at 686, 219 P. at
20.
3. "In the eight community property states, [the] UMPA would mainly
cause cosmetic changes in procedure." Quinn, Shared Property Ownership
Should Be Part of Marriage Law, Wash. Post, Aug. 22, 1983, at 50, coL 1. The
eight community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.
4. Important changes proposed by the UMPA include §§ 12 and 13 (classi-
fying life insurance policies and proceeds and deferred employment benefits as
marital property), § 10 (recognizing enforceable marital property agreements),
and §§ 2 and 15(a) (imposing a duty of "good faith" behavior with respect to
property between spouses and providing a cause of action for breach of that
duty). All references to the UMPA are to the 1983 draft.
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worthy of which are those relating to debt and credit. For ex-
ample, the Act enables one spouse to incur an obligation that
creates liability for the property of the other spouse, without
joining the other spouse in the creation of the obligation, with-
out notice that the obligation is being incurred, and even de-
spite the nondebtor spouse's express disapproval of the
obligation. 5 Further, although a nondebtor spouse's property
may be liable for obligations incurred by the other spouse, the
nondebtor spouse may still be denied most incidents of owner-
ship for those credit acquisitions, even though having an actual
ownership interest.6 These results mark a significant departure
from existing property law in common law jurisdictions.
This Note examines the Act's provisions on debt and credit
and the changes these provisions would cause in common law
states. The Note first reviews the debt and credit provisions of
the common law7 and American community property law.8 The
Note then examines the UMPA sections on debt and credit, 9
particularly those providing for the forced sharing of liabili-
ties,' 0 the management and control of marital property," and
the protection of a spouse's marital property interests.12 Fi-
nally, the Note evaluates these changes in light of the interests
the Act was designed to promote,13 and concludes with a mod-
est proposal for maximizing the benefits of the Act while avoid-
ing potentially undesirable results.14
The Act is deserving of this timely analysis. The Wisconsin
legislature has recently enacted legislation very similar to the
UMPA,15 and other legislatures are likely to consider the Act in
the near future.' 6 Identification of the potential strengths and
5. See U.M.P.A. § 8. This section has no joinder or notice requirement.
The conclusion that liability can be created despite the nondebtor spouse's ex-
press disapproval derives from judicial interpretations of nearly identical com-
munity property law provisions. See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
6. See U.M.P.A. § 5; infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 37-67 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 109-20 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
15. See Marital Property Act, 1983 Wis. Laws 186.
16. The UMPA has been under consideration by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws since 1977 and has been discussed at American Bar Asso-
ciation meetings, state bar association meetings, and a public hearing in Wash-
ington, D.C. in February, 1983. Wenig, The Marital Property Act, 69 WOMEN
LAw. J. 9, 10 (1983). At the public hearing, only one organization, the Wisconsin
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weaknesses of the Act's unique approach should aid legislative
consideration of the proposed uniform law.
I. DEBT AND CREDIT OF SPOUSES UNDER COMMON
LAW AND AMERICAN COMMUNITY PROPERTY
LAW
Instead of proposing an entirely new approach to marital
property law, the UIMPA draws heavily on existing common law
and American community property law concepts. An under-
standing of the principles underlying the common law and
community property law regimes is therefore essential to an
understanding of the Act and the inequities it sought to
overcome.
A. DEBT AND CREDIT OF SPOUSES UNDER COMMON LAW
In common law jurisdictions, property rights, both for mar-
ried and single persons, generally are based upon title.17 Who-
ever holds title to an item of property has the right to the
incidents of ownership of that property, to the exclusion of all
others without title.18 Acquiring title, other than in cases of gift
Bar Association, opposed the Act. At the 1983 annual meeting of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, representatives from
thirty-five states voted to adopt the Act. Personal correspondence from William
Cantwell, Reporter for the UMPA (Aug. 26, 1983). The American Bar Associa-
tion's House of Delegates approved the Act at their August, 1984 meeting "as an
appropriate act for those-states desiring to adopt the substantive law suggested
therein." American Bar Association OKs Uniform Marital Property Act, 52
U.S.LW. 1027 (Aug. 27, 1984). Legislation modeled after the UMPA is under
consideration in Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Missouri. Winter,
UMPA Fights for Recognition, 70 A.B.A.J. 76, 76 (1984).
17. Title enables an owner of property to maintain or assert possession
and enjoyment of the property. Robertson v. Van Cleave, 129 Ind. 217, 232. 29
N.E. 781, 782 (1892), affig 26 N.E. 899 (1891); Loy v. Home Ins. Co., 24 Minn. 315,
318 (1877); Chapman v. Dougherty, 87 Mo. 617, 620 (1885). Title has been held to
be the "foundation of ownership" in common law states. Loy v. Home Ins. Co,
24 Minn. at 318; Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Allen, 43 N.Y. 389, 395
(1871); In re Morgan's Estate, 223 Pa. 228, 232, 72 A. 498, 500 (1909). Title has
even been defined as ownership. Hawkins v. Stiles, 158 S.W. 1011, 1021 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1913), rev'd on other grounds, 207 S.W. 89 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1918).
18. See Houston v. Farris, 71 Ala. 570, 571 (1882); Ganbaum v. Rockwood
Realty Corp, 62 Misc. 2d 391, 395-96, 308 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440-41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
In most common law states, spouses' property rights largely depend upon
their monetary contributions to the acquisitions of the marriage. Greene, Com-
parison of the Property Aspects of the Community Property and Common-Law
Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Compatibility with the Current
View of the Marriage Relationship and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGrrON L.
Rav. 71, 83 (1979). For example, in some jurisdictions, upon dissolution of the
marriage a non-wage-earning spouse likely would retain very little of the accu-
mulated property. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2-21, 48-3-16 (1980). In most
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
or devise, usually requires the exchange of capital, either
money or property.19
The institution of marriage has little effect on the basic title
approach.20 The common law title system treats spouses like
strangers with respect to property rights;2 1 both spouses own
other common law jurisdictions, state statutes provide for an "equitable divi-
sion" of property. Cantwell, Man + Woman + Property = ?, 6 PROB. LAW 1, 44-45
(1980). An "equitable division," however, is not defined, leaving the court dis-
cretion to consider relevant factors including the contribution of each spouse to
the acquisition of marital property. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (a)
(1974); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190(1) (a) (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1982);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (1981).
19. See In re Gill's Estate, 79 Iowa 296, 299-300, 44 N.W. 553, 554 (1890);
Stamm v. Bostwick, 122 N.Y. 48, 50-51, 25 N.E. 233, 233 (1890); Lynn v. Rainey,
400 P.2d 805, 811 (Okla. 1964).
20. A major aspect of the development of marital property law in the com-
mon law states has been the decreasing importance of the institution of mar-
riage. At early common law, marriage critically affected the property rights of
spouses, particularly wives, because the legal identity of the wife merged into
that of her husband. See Cantwell, supra note 18, at 11. It often is remarked
that "[tlhe common law regarded the husband and wife as one and the hus-
band as the one." J. CRIBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 86 (1975).
In marriage, the husband acquired absolute ownership, control, and manage-
ment of the wife's tangible personal property. W. McCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY
PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNIrED STATES § 2:21 (1982); see generally 3 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 526-27 (6th ed. 1938); 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MATAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 404-06 (2d ed. 1968). If the wife owned
any real property, the husband acquired an estate in the property with the
right to use and enjoy the profits thereof. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 5.52 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); Haskins, The Estate by the Marital Right, 97 U. PA.
L REV. 345, 345 (1949). For the purposes of property ownership and the ability
to contract, the married woman ceased to have a legal identity. Phipps, Ten-
ancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24, 24 (1951). In return for this loss of legal
identity, the wife received three rights: (1) the right to be supported by her
husband; (2) the right to pass liability for antenuptial debts and postnuptial
torts on to her husband; and (3) the right of dower in her husband's real prop-
erty. Greene, supra note 18, at 77.
This situation began to change significantly in the 1840's with the emer-
gence of Married Women's Property Acts. See generally W. McCLANAHAN,
supra, at § 2:24; Hitchcock, Modern Legislation Touching Marital Property
Rights, 6 So. L. REV. 633 (1880); Kirkwood, Equality of Property Interests Be-
tween Husband and Wife, 8 MINN. L. REV. 579, 580-83 (1924). These statutes re-
turned a legal identity to married women. They granted married women equal
rights to contract, own, use, and dispose of property, and to sue and be sued.
W. McCLANAHAN, supra, at § 2:24.
These statutes have been enacted in all the common law states and are the
underpinnings of the modern common law approach to marital property rights.
They essentially make the fact of marriage irrelevant to most issues of property
by giving both spouses rights in property as if they were unmarried. See, e.g.,
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-9-2 (Burns 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 404.020(1) (Supp. 1982);
MINN. STAT. § 519.02 (1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-3-1 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:2-16 (West 1968).
21. Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband
and Wife, 15 MOD. L. REV. 133, 135 (1952).
[Vol. 69:111
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and control the property to which they have title.22 Marriage
does not affect the rules as to the acquisition of title. Only after
termination of the marriage, either by death or dissolution, may
a spouse be entitled to acquire title to part of the other
spouse's property.2 3
The title approach to marital property rights can yield ineq-
uitable results when only one spouse earns money wages.
Property acquired during the marriage often is titled solely in
the wage-earning spouse. The spouse who does not earn
money wages may be effectively precluded from acquiring
property because of a lack of resources with which to obtain
credit.24 If that spouse contributes considerable time and labor
to the maintenance of the home and care of the family, a clear
inequity results. Thus, the title approach does not recognize
the important contributions of the non-wage-earning spouse to
the marriage.
Although most common law states have moved away from
the traditional title approach in some areas of marital property
law, such as probate and divorce, 25 they have continued to rely
22. See, e.g., Fischer v. Wirth, 38 A.D.2d 611, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1971); Ras-
mussen v. Oshkosh Savings & Loan Ass'n, 35 Wis. 2d 605, 151 N.W.2d 730 (1967).
In Fischer, the couple held their home and savings in the husband's name with
the wife's income going to household expenses. Upon divorce, after more than
twenty years of marriage, the court denied the wife's request for a declaration
that she owned half of the assets held in her husband's name. Fischer, 38
A.D.2d at 612, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
23. At the termination of a marriage, statutes in most common law states
give spouses interests in property acquired during the marriage regardless of
the title to the property. See infra note 25. In cases of termination by the death
of a spouse, all states except South Dakota give the surviving spouse ah elec-
tive share in the estate of the deceased spouse. W. McCLANAHAN, supra note
20, at § 2:25; see, e.g., MImN. STAT. § 525.145 (1982). Since this acquisition essen-
tially is by judicial or legislative decree, it may be perceived as a "mere gratu-
ity" rather than property "earned." Greene, supra note 18, at 83.
24. Greene, supra note 18, at 83; see also W. BROCKELBAmN, THE CObW-
NITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO 39-41 (1962); Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and
Injustices in the Law of Husband and Wife, 16 MOD. L Rav. 34,35 (1953) (mar-
ried woman who lived with her husband was incapable of having money or
property unless given to her for her separate use). Even if a vife were able to
save money out of the household allowance given her by her husband, the sav-
ings likely would belong to the husband. Greene, supra note 18, at 83 n.65.
25. See supra note 23. Early common law gave a surviving spouse a life es-
tate in some portion of the deceased spouse's real estate, "dower" if the wife
survived and "curtesy" if the husband did. Haskins, supra note 20, at 345, 346.
Dower was a life estate entitling the widow to one-third of all the property in
which the husband was seized in fee at any time during coverture. Wilson v.
Hilligoss, 278 Ill. App. 564, 572 (1935); In re Zweig's Will, 145 Misc. 839, 843, 261
N.Y.S. 400, 405 (1932); Griffin v. Griffin, 191 N.C. 227, 229, 131 S.E. 585, 586 (1926).
Curtesy was a life estate to the husband in all the estates of inheritance in land
that his wife possessed during their marriage. Haskins, supra note 20, at 345.
19841
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on title as a measure of creditworthiness. 26 A spouse who does
Most states have abolished the common law estates and replaced them with an
"elective share" or similar interest in the deceased spouse's property. J. CRIB-
BET, supra note 20, at 86-89; 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 217 (1950); see, e.g.,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 18 (1978). One state, South Dakota, provides no interest
in the property of the other spouse. In 1889 South Dakota abolished common
law dower and curtesy without creating any statutory interest in lieu thereof.
See S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 25-2-4, 29-1-3 (1976).
During the 1970's most common law states enacted statutes giving their
courts "equitable jurisdiction" to distribute marital property during divorce
proceedings. See Cantwell, supra note 18, at 44-45. Although the common law
has traditionally circumscribed the title approach in determining property in-
terests upon the death of a spouse, this approach is only a recent development
with regard to marital dissolution. The stimulus for this development came
from three sources. First, no-fault divorce, in separating notions of culpability
from the marital dissolution, shifted the focus to a concern for just and equita-
ble treatment of both parties, particularly with respect to property. Cantwell,
supra note 18, at 40. California was the first state to institute no-fault divorce at
the end of the 1960's. As of 1984, only two states, Pennsylvania and South Da-
kota, had not enacted no-fault divorce legislation. Second, the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act's property settlement provision provided for a just and
equitable division of marital property, taking into account a variety of factors.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 142-43 (1973). Finally, an
awareness that title to property often is not a reliable indicator of the relative
contributions of spouses to the marriage, particularly when one spouse is not a
wage earner, also strengthened the move away from the strict title approach.
In 1963, the Report of the Committee on the Civil and Political Rights to the
President's Commission on the Status of Women said:
Marriage is a partnership to which each spouse makes a different but
equally important contribution. This fact has become increasingly rec-
ognized in the realities of American family living. While the laws of
other countries have reflected this trend, family laws in the United
States have lagged behind. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that
during marriage each spouse should have a legally defined and sub-
stantial right in the earnings of the other spouse and in the real and
personal property acquired as a result of such earnings, as well as in
the management of such earnings and property. Such right should sur-
vive the marriage and be legally recognized in the event of its termina-
tion by annulment, divorce, or death. This policy should be
appropriately implemented by legislation which would safeguard either
spouse against improper alienation of property by the other.
REPORT OF THE COMMITEE ON THE CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS TO THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 18 (Comm. Print 1963).
The statutes giving courts "equitable jurisdiction" to distribute marital
property have created what has been termed a "deferred community," meaning
that the statutes take a community property approach to determining property
interests, but defer its effect until the termination of the marriage. In a de-
ferred community, the rights to ownership and management during the mar-
riage generally are determined by title. At the end of the marriage, however,
the equitable powers of the courts may allow a finding of distinct property
rights in a spouse as to the marital property, regardless of who initially ac-
quired it. Cantwell, supra note 18, at 19.
26. As to tenancies in common, see Janes v. LeDeit, 228 Cal. App. 2d 474, 39
Cal. Rptr. 559 (1964); Caifroy v. Fremlin, 198 Cal. App. 2d 176, 17 Cal. Rptr. 668
(1962); Nodiand v. Chirpich, 307 Minn. 360, 240 N.W.2d 513 (1976); Greiner-Maltz
Co. v. Stevens, 66 Misc. 2d 79, 319 N.Y.S.2d 512 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); Schank v.
North Am. Royalties, Inc., 201 N.W.2d 419 (N.D. 1972). As to joint tenancies, see
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not own property cannot encumber it.27 Moreover, whatever in-
terest a spouse has in the other spouse's property remains in-
choate until the termination of the marriage, whether by death
or divorce.28 The spouse has no right to create liability for the
property until after the marriage has ended and actual title is
granted by judicial decree.
The common law protects married persons against encum-
brance of their concurrent ownership interests in marital prop-
erty by a spouse.29 When marital property is held in a tenancy
in common or in a joint tenancy both spouses can subject only
their individual interests in the property to liability.30 Obliga-
tions created by one spouse do not allow creditors to attach the
other spouse's property interests. 1 When marital property is
held in a tenancy by the entirety, the only common law concur-
rent estate unique to marriage, the ability of spouses to encum-
ber even their own individual interests is restricted.32 In a
number of states, creditors of one spouse cannot reach the in-
Katsivalis v. Serrano Reconveyance Co., 70 CaL App. 3d 200, 138 Cal. Rptr. 620
(1977); Carbine v. Meyer, 126 Cal. App. 2d 386, 272 P.2d 849 (1954); Martin v.
Fritz, 194 Iowa 740, 190 N.W. 514 (1922); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Mc-
Ginnis, 571 P.2d 1198 (Okla. 1977).
27. See supra notes 18, 21-22 and accompanying text.
28. Greene, supra note 18, at 87.
29. In common law states, spouses may hold property individually, in a
joint tenancy, in a tenancy in common, or in a tenancy by the entirety.
30. The principal incident of a joint tenancy is the right of survivorship.
'T"hen one joint tenant dies the other is the sole owner; if there are severaljoint tenants, the deceased's share is owned by the survivors jointly." J. CRm-
BET, supra note 20, at 98. A joint tenancy does not require a marital relation-
ship and can involve any number of individuals. A joint tenancy can be
destroyed by a simple conveyance by one of the joint tenants. Id. at 101. The
tenancy in common is the most common of all concurrent estates. It contains
no special incidents, such as a right of survivorship. "[TIhe share of each ten-
ant is several and distinct from that of his cotenant, except that it is an undi-
vided interest so that he cannot lay claim to any specific portion of the whole
until there is a partition in kind." Id. at 103.
31. See cases cited supra note 26.
32. See J. CIUBBEr, supra note 20, at 95-106. In a tenancy by the entirety,
property titled in the names of both spouses is viewed as belonging to neither
spouse, but instead to the marital unit. Hutcherson v. United States, 92 F.
Supp. 168, 170 (WM). Mo. 1950), affd, 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951). This view is so
strong that a conveyance to a husband and wife in the entirety and to a third
person results in a conveyance of a one-half interest to the spouses and a one-
half interest to the third person. J. CrBBEr, supra note 20, at 95. Principal inci-
dents of a tenancy by the entirety include: (1) the right of survivorship; (2) the
inability to destroy the tenancy by unilateral action of a spouse; and (3) immu-
nity from claims of creditors that would destroy the estate. Cantwell. supra
note 18, at 27; see also Phipps, supra note 20, at 36-41.
The tenancy by the entirety is an estate of decreasing importance in mod-
em property law. Only twenty-two states continue to recognize this estate.
Cantwell, supra note 18, at 27.
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terest of either spouse in the entirety property to satisfy obliga-
tions.33 In other states, the only interests in entirety property
available to creditors are half of the income from the property
and the contingent survivorship right of the debtor spouse to
the property.34 Thus, the sole impact of marriage upon debt
and credit in common law jurisdictions is to restrict the ability
of an individual spouse to incur an obligation.35
The common law title approach protects spouses against
involuntary liability for the other spouse's debts. Common law
states do, however, recognize volitional sharing of liabilities.
Persons are liable for their spouse's debt or obligation only if
they joined in its creation.3 6 Joinder serves two interrelated
purposes. First, it establishes a moral basis for allocating loss.
If a spouse has joined in the action that created the loss or po-
tential for loss, it is more equitable to shift some of the actual
loss to that spouse than if he or she had not joined. The spouse
33. These jurisdictions are Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, In-
diana, Maryland, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wyoming. Phipps, supra note 20, at 39; see Citizens' Savings Bank, Inc. v. As-
trin, 44 Del. 451, 455, 61 A.2d 419, 421 (1948); Held v. McNett, 154 A.2d 349, 350
(D.C. 1959); Meyer v. Faust, 83 So.2d 847, 848 (Fla. 1955); Pension Fund v. Gul-
ley, 226 Ind. 415, 419, 81 N.E.2d 676, 678 (1948); Rue v. Haines, 229 Md. 268, 271,
182 A.2d 872, 873 (1962); Hanebrink v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 321 S.W.2d
524, 527 (Mo. App. 1959); Schweitzer v. Evans, 360 Pa. 552, 556, 63 A.2d 39, 41
(1949); Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452, 464-65, 25 A.2d 354, 360 (1942); Citizens'
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Jenkins, 91 Vt. 13, 20, 99 A. 250, 252 (1916); Oliver v.
Givens, 204 Va. 123, 126, 129 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1963); Amick v. Elwood, 77 Wyo. 269,
278, 314 P.2d 944, 947 (1957).
34. Such jurisdictions include Arkansas, New Jersey, New York, and Ore-
gon. Phipps, supra note 20, at 39; see Ellis v. Ashby, 227 Ark. 479, 481-82, 299
S.W.2d 206, 207-08 (1957); Dvorken v. Barrett, 100 N.J. Super. 306, 308, 241 A.2d
841, 842 (1968), aff'd, 53 N.J. 20, 247 A.2d 674 (1968); Lover v. Fennell, 14 Misc. 2d
874, 879, 179 N.Y.S.2d 1017, 1022 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958); Brownley v. Lincoln
County, 218 Or. 7, 11, 343 P.2d 529, 531 (1959). In Massachusetts, only the hus-
band's interest can be reached; the wife's interest in entirety property cannot
be reached by her creditors. I. BAXTER, MARrTAL PROPERTY § 3:4 (1973); Hale v.
Hale, 332 Mass. 329, 331, 125 N.E.2d 142, 143 (1955); Pineo v. White, 320 Mass. 487,
490, 70 N.E.2d 294, 297 (1946). In Kentucky and Tennessee only the contingent
right of survivorship is available to separate creditors. Phipps, supra note 20, at
39; see United States v. Ragsdale, 206 F. Supp. 613, 616 (W.D. Tenn. 1962); Fran-
cis v. Vastine, 229 Ky. 431, 434, 17 S.W.2d 419, 420 (1929).
35. Homestead protection statutes, which exist in many states, also restrict
the ability of an individual spouse to incur any obligation to the detriment of
the other spouse. These statutes prevent a spouse with sole title to the home-
stead property from conveying or encumbering the property without joinder by
the other spouse. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. § 507.02 (1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.475
(Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1984).
36. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Energy Fuels Corp., 200 Colo. 540, 544, 618
P.2d 1115, 1118 (1980); McLaughlin v. Cooper's Estate, 128 Conn. 557, 561, 24 A.2d
502, 504 (1942); Simkin v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 138 Ind. App. 668, 672, 214
N.E.2d 661, 663 (1966); Martin v. Fritz, 194 Iowa 740, 747, 190 N.W. 514, 517 (1922);
Adamsen Constr. Co. v. Altendorf, 152 N.W.2d 576, 579 (N.D. 1967).
[Vol. 69:111
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incurred "risks" by entering into the bargain. Second, joinder
ensures that any and all liable parties will have notice of the
obligation at the time it is incurred. Thus, although the com-
mon law may yield inequitable results with regard to the crea-
tion of property rights, the common law does provide effective
safeguards against the creation of interspousal liability.
B. DEBT AND CREDIT OF SPOUSES UNDER AMERICAN
COMMUNrrY PROPERTY LAW
Community property states provide spouses with present
concurrent interests in most of the assets acquired by either
spouse during the marriage.3? Louisiana, for example, defines
community property as:
property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the
effort, skill or industry of either spouse; property acquired with com-
munity things or with community and separate things . .. ; property
donated to the spouses jointly; natural and civil fruits of community
property; damages awarded for loss or injury to a thing belonging to
the community; and all other property not classified by law as separate
property.3
By giving each spouse a vested, present, and equal interest in
all of the economic rewards from the personal efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, community property law attempts
to avoid the inequities that arise under the common law title
system.39
Along with the sharing of ownership, however, American
community property law provides for the sharing of debts. In
Louisiana, for example, "[ain obligation incurred by a spouse
during the existence of a community property regime for the
common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other
spouse is a community obligation." 40 Thus, the community
property of both spouses may be liable for a debt incurred by
only one spouse. Such liability is a fundamental part of com-
munity property law,41 and although American community
property jurisdictions vary greatly in their application of this
principle, to some extent each recognizes this interspousal
37. W. REPPY & C. SAMUEL, CoMMUNry PROPERTY m THE UNITED STATES 1
(1982); 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 438 (3d ed. 1939).
38. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (West Supp. 1983).
39. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
40. LA. Cirv. CODE ANN. art. 2360 (West Supp. 1983); see also CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 5116 (West 1983) ("property of the community is liable for the contracts of
either spouse which are made after marriage").
41. W. DE FuINAK & A. VAUGHNm, PRINcIPLEs OF CoMMuNrrY PROPERTY § 159
(2d ed. 1971).
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liability.42
Joinder requirements for shared liability generally are ab-
sent in American community property states. 43 There are some
narrow exceptions to this rule. All community property states,
for example, require joinder to convey or encumber the home-
stead,44 and Washington prohibits the encumbrance of "com-
munity household goods, furnishings, or appliances" without
joinder.45 Beyond these limited exceptions, however, commu-
nity property law does not require joinder.
American community property law provides a presumption
of shared liability for debts incurred during the marriage. A
Louisiana statute, for example, provides, with some exceptions,
that "all obligations incurred by a spouse during the existence
of a community property regime are presumed to be commu-
nity obligations."46 Similarly, courts in Arizona,47 New Mex-
ico,48 Texas,49 and WashingtonSO have consistently declared
that contractual debts incurred during marriage are presump-
tively community debts.51 This presumption can only be over-
42. W. McCLANAHAN, supra note 20, at § 10:8.
43. See, e.g., Hofmann Co. v. Meisner, 17 Ariz. App. 263, 267, 497 P.2d 83, 87
(1972); Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 5 Ariz. App. 89, 91, 423 P.2d 364, 366 (1967); Fies v.
Storey, 37 Wash. 2d 105, 110, 221 P.2d 1031, 1033 (1950); Capital Nat'l Bank v.
Johns, 170 Wash. 250, 258, 16 P.2d 452, 454 (1932).
44. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214(c) (1) (1976); CAL. CIv. CODE § 5127
(West 1983); IDAHO CODE § 55-1006 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20:1 (West
1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230(3) (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-13 (1983); TEx.
FAm. CODE ANN. § 5.81 (Vernon 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (1982).
These statutes do not, however, prevent a spouse from endangering the prop-
erty. A spouse who obtains a loan and gives the creditor a mortgage to the
homestead without joinder of the other spouse still creates a debt collectible
from the community assets, although the mortgage is unenforceable. The
homestead is protected from liability only to the extent provided in homestead
exemption statutes, which might be a minimal monetary amount. See, e.g., IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-2-28-1 (Burns Supp. 1984) ($7,500); KY. REV. STAT. § 427.090
(1972) ($5,000).
45. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030(5) (1982).
46. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2361 (West Supp. 1984).
47. Donato v. Fishburn, 90 Ariz. 210, 213, 367 P.2d 245, 246 (1961); Morgan v.
Bruce, 76 Ariz. 121, 124, 259 P.2d 558, 560 (1953); McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz.
110, 113, 74 P.2d 1181, 1182 (1938); Cosper v. Valley Bank, 28 Ariz. 373, 382, 237 P.
175, 178 (1925); Hofmann Co. v. Meisner, 17 Ariz. App. 263, 267, 497 P.2d 83, 87
(1972); Garrett v. Shannon, 13 Ariz. App. 332, 333, 476 P.2d 538, 539 (1970).
48. Davidson v. Click, 31 N.M. 543, 556, 249 P. 10, 105 (1926); Strong v.
Eakin, 11 N.M. 107, 119-22, 66 P. 539, 542-43 (1901).
49. Foster v. Hackworth, 164 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
50. Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wash. 2d 68, 70, 272 P.2d 626, 627 (1954); Marquette
v. National Bank, 132 Wash. 181, 183, 231 P. 788, 789 (1925); Bryant v. Stetson &
Post Mill Co., 13 Wash. 692, 694, 43 P. 931, 931 (1896); Warren v. Washington
Trust Bank, 19 Wash. App. 348, 360, 575 P.2d 1077, 1085 (1978), aff'd, 92 Wash. 2d
381, 598 P.2d 701 (1979).
51. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 41, at § 159; W. McCLANA-
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come by "clear and convincing evidence" that the debt was not
incurred in the interest of, or with the intention to benefit, the
family.5 2
The family purpose restriction, moreover, may be more
technical than practical. No actual benefit to the community is
required 5 3 at most, the activity must have been somehow, al-
though not necessarily primarily, intended to benefit the com-
munity.5 4 Only when there could be no conceivable benefit
except to the individual spouse will an obligation incurred by a
spouse during marriage not be held to be incurred in the inter-
est of the community.55 Furthermore, existing case law demon-
strates that the notion of furthering community interests is so
HAN, supra note 20, at § 4.15; see also W. REPPY & C. SAiuEL, supra note 37, at
53-55.
52. Hofmann Co. v. Meisner, 17 Ariz. App. 263, 267, 497 P.2d 83, 87 (1972);
Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wash. 2d 68, 70, 272 P.2d 626, 627 (1954); Warren v. Washing-
ton Trust Bank, 19 Wash. App. 348, 361, 575 P.2d 1077, 1085 (1978). The commu-
nity property may be liable for spouses' torts as well as their contractual debts.
This extension of tort liability to the entire community property is not a prod-
uct of historical community property law, but of American community property
states' interpretation of community property law through common law princi-
ples. W. DE FuNiAx & M. VAUGHN, supra note 41, at §§ 181, 182. In some states,
liability may extend to the community property regardless of the circum-
stances of the tortious conduct. In California, for example, tort liability is satis-
fied first out of community property and then out of the separate property of
the tortfeasor spouse if the liability is based upon an act or omission that oc-
curred while "performing an activity for the benefit of the community." CAL.
Crv. CODE § 5122(b) (1) (West 1983). Texas also provides for this sort of broad
liability. TEx. FAiL CODE ANN. § 5.61(d) (Vernon 1975). If such an activity is
not involved, the community property may still be held liable for the tort. CAL.
CirV. CODE § 5122(b) (2). Most states, however, recognize community liability
for torts only if the torts are committed while furthering the interest of the
community. See, e.g., Mortensen v. Knight, 81 Ariz. 325, 334, 305 P.2d 463, 469
(1956); Simpson v. Shaw, 71 Ariz. 293, 296, 226 P.2d 557, 560 (1951); McFadden v.
Watson, 51 Ariz. 110, 114, 74 P.2d 1181, 1182 (1938); Garret v. Shannon, 13 Ariz.
App. 332, 333, 476 P.2d 538, 539 (1970); Howe v. Haught, 11 Ariz. App. 98, 100, 462
P.2d 395, 397 (1969); McHenry v. Short, 29 Wash. 2d 263, 273, 186 P.2d 900, 905
(1947); Benson v. Bush, 3 Wash. App. 777, 778, 477 P.2d 929, 929 (1970); Cross,
The Community Property Law in Washington, 49 WAsH. L. REv. 729, 834-39
(1974); Pruzan, Community Property and Tort Liability in Washington, 23
WASH. L REV. 259, 260 (1948).
53. See, e.g., McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110, 115, 74 P.2d 1181, 1183 (1938)
(community property of both spouses liable for husband's libel and slander).
54. Hofmann Co. v. Meisner, 17 Ariz. App. 263, 268, 497 P.2d 83, 88 (1972);
Oil Heat Co. v. Sweeney, 26 Wash. App. 351, 355, 613 P.2d 169, 172 (1980); see also
DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 50, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1967); Donato
v. Fishburn, 90 Ariz. 210, 213, 367 P.2d 245, 247 (1961); Malotte v. Gorton, 75
Wash. 2d 306, 309, 450 P.2d 820, 822 (1969); Henning v. Anderson, 121 Wash. 53,
55-56, 207 P. 1048, 1049 (1922); Way v. Lyric Theater Co., 79 Wash. 275, 278, 140 P.
320, 321 (1914); Cross, supra note 52, at 824.
55. See J.L Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Wiley, 89 Wash. 301,303, 154 P. 437,
437 (1916); Bank of Washington v. Hilltop Shakemill, Inc., 26 Wash. App. 943,
949, 614 P.2d 1319, 1322 (1980).
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vague that it provides virtually no bar to liability.56 Taken to-
gether, the expansive interpretation of family purpose and the
presumption of shared liability for debts require a nondebtor
spouse seeking to avoid liability to prove there was not "any
expectation of benefit to the community . . . at the time the
[obligation was incurred]."57
In most community property states, a spouse's power to
manage and control the community property is the critical de-
terminant of his or her individual ability to create community
liability.5 8 If a spouse has management and control power over
the community property, community liability may be created
without the knowledge and consent of the nondebtor spouse.59
Some courts have justified this rule by treating the managing
spouse as an "agent" of the community. 60 According to agency
principles, principals are liable whenever their agents are act-
ing within the scope of their actual or apparent authority, de-
spite the principal's lack of actual notice.61 Thus, if the debtor
spouse has management and control powers and the obligation
was intended to benefit the community or was incurred in the
course of community business, 62 the community is liable, re-
gardless of the nondebtor spouse's lack of notice.63 In such a
case, the nondebtor spouse's express disapproval of the debt
prior to its incurrence would not avoid community liability.
The absence of a notice requirement appears to be based on
56. See, e.g., King v. Williams, 188 Wash. 350, 62 P.2d 710 (1936). In King.
the court held that the community property was liable when a husband negli-
gently injured a person in an automobile collision during a "night out with the
boys," because recreational activities '"promote and advance the general wel-
fare of the community." 188 Wash. at 351, 62 P.2d at 710. Similarly, in Arizona
the community property was liable when a husband negligently crashed the
flight school's plane while taking flying lessons for pleasure. Reckart v. Arva
Valley Air, Inc., 19 Ariz. App. 538, 509 P.2d 231 (1973); see also Reed v. Loncy, 22
Wash. 433, 61 P. 41 (1900) (community liable for husband's guarantee of his
son's debt even though the contract brought no monetary benefit to the com-
munity because it discharged a moral obligation of the community to the son
for uncompensated labor).
57. Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wash. 2d 68, 70, 272 P.2d 626, 627 (1954).
58. W. REPPY & C. SAMuEL, supra note 37, at 251; see Grolemund v. Caffer-
ata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 683-84, 111 P.2d 641, 643-44, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 612 (1941).
59. See Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 5 Ariz. App. 89, 91-92, 423 P.2d 364, 366-67
(1967); see also Donato v. Fishburn, 90 Ariz. 210, 212-13, 367 P.2d 245, 246 (1961).
60. See McHenry v. Short, 29 Wash. 2d 263, 274, 186 P.2d 900, 906 (1947);
Werker v. Knox, 197 Wash. 453, 457, 85 P.2d 1041, 1043 (1938); Milne v. Kane, 64
Wash. 254, 255-56, 116 P. 659, 659 (1911).
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 268 (1958) (notification given
to an agent is imputed to the principal).
62. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
63. See Donato v. Fishburn, 90 Ariz. 210, 213-14, 367 P.2d 245, 246-47 (1961);
Fies v. Storey, 37 Wash. 2d 105, 112, 221 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (1950).
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the assumption that the debtor spouse will protect the commu-
nity interest and give the other spouse whatever notice is
needed.64
Although joint management and control of community
property may be equitable, there is a significant problem of
mismanagement because both spouses have the opportunity to
mismanage.6 5 Several community property states have at-
tempted to solve the problem of mismanagement through the
adoption of the common law concept of title.66 Tying manage-
ment and control to title, however, seriously disadvantages the
non-wage-earning spouse even in community property states.
Because property acquired during the marriage is often titled
solely in the name of the wage-earning spouse, the wage-earn-
ing spouse can encumber virtually all of the marital property,
even though the non-wage-earning spouse has an interest in
one-half of the marital property.67 Thus, both the common law
and community property systems are torn between the inequi-
ties of the title approach to management and control and the
problem of mismanagement inherent in allowing each spouse
to encumber all of the marital property without notice and
consent.
IL UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF THE UMCPA
The TJAIPA rejects, in large part, the common law title ap-
64. See W. REPPY & C. SAMuEL, supra note 37, at 267.
65. W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 20, § 9:12, at 468. Because of the manage-
ment and control provisions, the community property states' sharing approach
historically has provided only an illusion of equality. During the early nine-
teenth century, the community property states uniformly provided the husband
with sole power to manage and control community property. See IV. DE FutiAK
& L VAUGHN, supra note 41, at § 113; W. McCLAxAxAN, supra note 20, at §§ 9.4-
9:6. Slowly, through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, states began to
limit the husband's exclusive power, primarily with respect to real property, see
W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 20, at §§ 9:7-9:8. Only since 1970 have equal man-
agement rights for both husband and wife become the norm in community
property states. See id. at §§ 9:11-9:12. Statutes generally require dual manage-
ment or joinder for community real property and allow "separate and equal"
management for community personality. TEx. FAB1 CODE ANN. § 912, at 466-67.
66. See id. at § 9:14. In Louisiana and New Mexico reliance on title is lim-
ited in scope. Thus, in Louisiana title determines management only for titled
movables, see LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art 2351 (West Supp. 1984), whereas in New
Mexico title controls only the management of community personal property,
see NVL. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-14(B) (1978). In Texas, however, management and
control rights to all community property are determined by title. See TEx. FAMi
CODE ANN. § 5.24 (Vernon 1975). Both spouses have exclusive power over the
community property they would own if unmarried. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22.
67. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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proach,68 viewing title as an unreliable and inadequate indica-
tor of the actual contributions of each spouse to the marriage.
Instead, the Act embraces the "sharing ideal" of community
property law. The drafters of the Act state:
The fundamental principle that ownership of all of the economic re-
wards from the personal effort of each spouse during marriage is
shared by the spouses in vested, present, and equal interests is the
heart of the community property system. It is also the heart of the
Uniform Marital Property Act .... Sharing is seen as a system of ele-
mental fairness and justice so that those who share in the many and
diverse forms of work involved in establishing and maintaining a mar-
riage will have a protected share in the material acquisitions of that
marriage.
6 9
With the important exception of the management and control
of property, title under the Act, as under community property
law, "operates almost as a simple convenience, [having little]
to do with the establishment of underlying ownership rights."7 0
The UMPA forces spouses to share ownership of virtually
all property acquired during the marriage. The Act accom-
plshes sharing by providing that "[ e] ach spouse has a present
undivided one-half interest in marital property.' '7 1 Marital
property includes all property of the spouses except that which
is owned by a spouse at the time of marriage7 2 or is acquired
during the marriage under certain limited circumstances, such
as by gift or devise.7 3 This forced sharing is strengthened by a
presumption that all property, whenever acquired, is marital
property.74 Such sharing can only be avoided by a voluntary
gift, a marital agreement, or a court decree.75 Thus, in recogni-
tion of their nonmonetary contributions to the marriage, the
Act's sharing approach strengthens the ownership rights of ec-
ononically disadvantaged spouses.
The UMPA similarly mandates the forced sharing of debts
without joinder. It provides that "an obligation incurred by a
spouse in the interest of the marriage or the family may be sat-
isfied only from all marital property and all other property of
that spouse that is not marital property."76 Thus, when an indi-
vidual spouse incurs a debt, the other spouse is forced to share
68. See W. McCLANAHA., supra note 20, § 14:5, at 646.
69. U.M.P.A. prefatory note at 12.
70. See Cantwell, supra note 18, at 21.
71. U.M.P.A. § 4(c).
72. U.M.P.A. §§ 4(a), 4(f).
73. U.M.P.A. § 4(g).
74. U.M.P.A. § 4(b).
75. U.M.P.A. § 4(g) (4).
76. U.M.P-A. § 8(b) (ii).
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the liability because "all marital property" is potentially liable.
Only the individual property of the nondebtor spouse is pro-
tected. The extent of the forced sharing in this provision is sig-
nificant. Although the Act only gives each spouse a one-half
interest in the ownership of marital property, it permits a
spouse to create liability for all of the marital property.
As in community property states, the minimal restrictions
the Act does provide are further minimized by the presumption
of shared liability. The Act provides that "[a]n obligation in-
curred by a spouse during marriage, including one attributable
to an act or omission during marriage, is presumed to be in-
curred in the interest of the marriage or the family."77 This
provision places the burden on the spouse seeking to avoid lia-
bility for an obligation to show that the obligation was not in-
curred in the interest of the family.78 Failing this, the entire
marital property is liable for the obligation.
Although the UMPA adopts a sharing approach for owner-
ship of marital property and for debt liability, the rules gov-
erning management and control of the marital property are
based on the traditional title approach. Although the Act gives
spouses equal ownership rights in the marital property,
spouses are denied many of the benefits of that ownership
when the property is held solely in one spouse's name.79 The
operative term is "held." The Act provides that:
[piroperty is "held" by a person only if a document of title to the prop-
erty is registered, recorded, or filed in a public office in the name of the
person or a writing that customarily operates as a document of title to
the type of property is issued for the property in the person's name.8 0
Thus, under the UIV[PA, as under the common law, title deter-
mines management and control rights.
The Act's management and control provisions significantly
limit the impact of the forced sharing of ownership. A spouse
acting alone may manage and control "that spouse's property
that is not marital property;... marital property held in that
spouse's name alone or not held in the name of either
77. U.MLP.A. § 8(a).
78. The UMPA differs from community property law in that its family pur-
pose presumption creates only a "burden of proving that the nonexistence of
the presumed condition is more probable than its existence," U.M.P.A. § 1(14),
whereas community property states generally require that the presumption be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence, see supra note 52 and accompany-
ing text. Given the UMPA's heavy reliance upon community property law in
other aspects of its liability provisions, the practical implications of this distinc-
tion remain unclear.
79. See U.M.P.A. § 5.
80. U -.p4 § 1(9).
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spouse; ... [and] marital property held in the names of both
spouses in the alternative . . . ."81 Joinder is required to man-
age and control "marital property held in the name of both
spouses other than in the alternative."82 The Act defines man-
agement and control as "the right to buy, sell, use, transfer, ex-
change, abandon, lease, consume, expend, assign, create a
security interest in, mortgage, encumber, dispose of, . . . or
otherwise deal with property as if it were property of an un-
married person."83 This very broad definition encompasses es-
sentially every incident of ownership without providing actual
sole ownership. 84 Thus, despite the UMPA's forced sharing of
ownership approach, the Act's management and control provi-
81. U.M.P.A. § 5(a).
82. U.M.P.A. § 5(b). The Act does not specifically address the ability of a
spouse to manage and control marital property solely held in the name of the
other spouse. Because § 5(a) appears to be exhaustive of the possible situa-
tions when a spouse acting alone can manage and control property, the reason-
able implication is that a spouse cannot independently manage and control
such property.
The drafters of the VMPA attempted to minimize joinder requirements for
debts. Personal correspondence from William P. Cantwell, Reporter for the
UMPA (Nov. 28, 1983). Because this joinder requirement is a management and
control provision, it might apply only when the interests in a particular piece of
property are at issue. In the case of an unsecured debt, it might not apply be-
cause an unsecured debt does not give the creditor an interest in any particular
property. As long as the debtor spouse has the power to act alone with regard
to sufficient assets, individual and marital, to establish creditworthiness for the
amount of the loan, the joinder requirement of the management and control
provision would not be applicable. Once the loan is made, however, all marital
property probably would be available to satisfy the debt upon default.
83. U.M.P.A. § 1(11). Under a literal interpretation of the UMPA, a spouse
"acting alone" cannot "sell," "assign," "encumber," or even "use" or "consume"
marital property solely held in the name of the other spouse. Such an interpre-
tation, however, would lead to untenable results by giving a nontitled spouse
even fewer rights than under the common law system. More likely, courts
would construe the management and control provisions and the comments
thereto as applicable only to third parties and not between spouses. See
U.M.P.A. § 5 comment. Even under this construction, however, a spouse could
be denied significant rights in marital property.
84. The incidents of ownership of property include the right to possession,
the right to use and enjoyment of the property, the right to exclude all others
from possession or use, the right to change the property, and the right to sell or
dispose of the property as the owner wishes. See Superior Bath House Co. v.
McCarroll, 312 U.S. 176, 180-81 (1941); United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 736, 740
(5th Cir. 1961); Kraft Foods Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 164 F. Supp. 168, 182
(W.D. Wis. 1958), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 266 F.2d 254 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 832 (1959); Lushing v. Riviera Estates Ass'n, 196 Cal.
App. 2d 687, 689, 16 Cal. Rptr. 763, 764 (1961); City of Chicago v. Rosser, 47 Ill. 2d
10, 17, 264 N.E.2d 158, 162 (1970); Johnson v. Marshall, 232 Iowa 299, 301, 4 N.W.2d
369, 370-71 (1942); John Wanamaker, Philadelphia v. School Dist. of Philadel-
phia, 441 Pa. 567, 572, 274 A.2d 524, 526 (1971).
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sions allow one spouse to enjoy exclusively all the benefits of
the marital property by holding it in his or her name.
IIL THE UMPA AND EXISTING LAW: A COMPARISON
The UMPA blends the sharing of ownership and debt liabil-
ity that characterizes community property law with the com-
mon law title approach to management and control.
Unfortunately, although the drafters of the Act recognized the
inequities of the common law approach to marital property
rights, they failed to recognize the problems inherent in the
forced sharing of liabilities. This section explores the inequi-
ties that will continue under the Act when spouses are forced
to share liabilities without corresponding ownership rights and
without adequate protections for the nondebtor spouse.
A. SHAnG OF LiAmrIES
The ability of one spouse freely to prejudice the interest of
the other in concurrently owned property under the UMPA cre-
ates several potentially undesirable results not present at com-
mon law. First, each spouse risks losing all of his or her
interest in the marital property due to an obligation incurred
by the other spouse. The limitation of liability to all marital
property plus the individual property of the debtor spouse has
no practical value when the nondebtor spouse has no individ-
ual property.85 The nondebtor spouse could lose everything.
Moreover, because the Act does not require joinder, the
nondebtor spouse's notice and consent become important. The
Act does not specifically require notice or consent. It does re-
quire that "[e]ach spouse shall act in good faith with respect to
the other spouse in matters involving marital property."86
Neither that provision nor the comments, however, indicate
whether good faith requires notice to the nondebtor spouse
before a debt is incurred. In California and other community
property states having a similar good faith provision,87 lack of
notice is unlikely to be a successful defense to a debt incurred
individually by one's spouse.88 Accordingly, lack of notice
under the UMPA probably will not protect the nondebtor
85. See U.M.P.A. § 8(b) (ii).
86. U.M.P.A. § 2.
87. U.M.P.A. § 2 comment see, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 5125(e) (West 1982).
88. See CadweU v. Cadwell, 126 Ariz. 460, 463, 616 P.2d 920, 923 (1980); Love-
tro v. Steers, 234 Cal. App. 2d 461, 473-74, 44 Cal. Rptr. 604, 611-12 (1965); Fies v.
Storey, 37 Wash. 2d 105, 112, 221 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (1950).
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spouse's interest in the marital property from an obligation in-
curred by the other spouse.
Because the management and control rule allows a spouse
with title to the marital property to encumber it without notice
to or consent of the other spouse, Washington courts have held
that due process does not forbid a community creditor from
seizing the half interest of the nondebtor spouse under a judg-
ment naming only the debtor spouse as a defendant.89 In
Washington, even the nondebtor spouse's express disapproval
of the debt may not avoid community liability when the debtor
spouse has management and control powers.90 Consequently,
if American community property law is an accurate guide, no-
tice and consent requirements will not be implied under the
UMPA when the debtor spouse has management and control
powers. As in American community property law, the only re-
striction on the nondebtor spouse's liability is the toothless
family purpose requirement.91
In conjunction with other UMPA provisions, the impact of
the Act's presumption of shared liability is significant. For ex-
89. See Oil Heat Co. v. Sweeney, 26 Wash. App. 351, 356, 613 P.2d 169, 172
(1980); Komm v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 23 Wash. App. 593, 598-99,
597 P.2d 1372, 1375 (1979).
90. See Bellingham Motors Corp. v. Lindberg, 126 Wash. 684, 686-87, 219 P.
19, 20 (1923); see also Donato v. Fishburn, 90 Ariz. 210, 213, 367 P.2d 245, 246
(1961) (note signed by husband for use in his business is a comunity obligation
even though the creditor requested the wife's signature and the husband re-
fused to involve her); Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 5 Ariz. App. 89, 91-92, 423 P.2d 364,
366-67 (1967) (wife's interest in community property liable for husband's de-
fault on promissory notes despite her affidavit stating she did not sign or acqui-
esce to the note).
91. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. The presumption of a
family purpose provided in the UMPA deviates from American community
property law by including each spouse's tort liabilities. See U.M.P.A. § 8(a).
The comments to section 8(a) suggest that this inclusion is consistent with
community property law. U.M.P.A. § 8 comment. Community property authori-
ties, however, state that no presumption of community obligation exists for tort
liability. See W. REPPY & C. SAMuEL, supra note 37, at 266; Cross, supra note 52,
at 836; see also Garrett v. Shannon, 13 Ariz. App. 332, 334, 476 P.2d 538, 540
(1970). The presumption with respect to contract obligations is often rational-
ized by a spouse's power to manage and control the community property, in-
cluding the power to "contract for community debts." Garrett v. Shannon, 13
Ariz. App. 332, 333-34, 476 P.2d 538, 539-40 (1970). Neither the American commu-
nity property statutes nor the UMPA, however, give a spouse the power to com-
mit torts in the "interest of the family." Tort liability is distinguishable from a
contract obligation in that a tort involves wrongful conduct on the part of the
spouse. As a result, in American community property law there is a "disposi-
tion by the courts to treat differently the questions of tort and contractual lia-
bility insofar as concerns presumptions and burdens of proof." Garrett, 13 Ariz.
App. at 334, 476 P.2d at 540. The drafters of the UMPA did not recognize this
distinction, but instead enlarged the scope of shared liability.
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ample, in order to protect particular assets from liability, the
nondebtor spouse must rebut the initial presumption that all
property is marital.9 2 1f the assets initially had been individual
property but had since become mixed with marital property,
the presumption applies "unless the component of the mixed
property which is not marital property can be traced."93 Fur-
thermore, even rebutting the presumption of shared liability
may not protect marital property from creditors because at
least two provisions in the Act indicate that the interests of
creditors and bona fide purchasers have priority over the
claims of innocent spouses.94 Thus, the creditor may still be
able to recover from the entire marital property unless it was
or should have been obvious to the creditor that the obligation
was not incurred in the interest of the family. The rebuttal of
the presumption of marital liability might only provide the
nondebtor spouse with a cause of action against the debtor
spouse.9 5
Moreover, the debtor spouse's individual property may re-
main secure if the obligation can be satisfied out of the marital
property. The Act is silent as to whether the marital property
or the debtor spouse's individual property should first be
looked to to satisfy obligations. The general rule in community
property jurisdictions, however, is that the marital property is
exhausted before any of the debtor spouse's individual prop-
erty is used.9 6 Thus, the marital property of the nondebtor
spouse may become liable for obligations before the individual
property of the spouse who incurred the obligation. Such a re-
sult is inconsistent with the underlying goal of the shared own-
ership of property of recognizing and giving credit to each
spouse's contribution to the marriage.
B. MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
Leaving control dependent upon title seems to strike
92. See U.M.P.A. § 4(b).
93. U.M.P.A. § 14(a).
94. See U.M.P.A. §§ 8(e), 9.
95. U.MLP.A. § 15.
96. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 41, at §§ 159, 170. For exam-
ple, New Mexico's law provides that:
[c]ommunitg debts shall be satisfied first from all community prop-
erty ... excluding the residence of the spouses. Should such property
be insufficient, community debts shall then be satisfied from the resi-
dence of the spouses .... Should such property be insufficient, only
the separate property of the spouse who contracted or incurred the
debt shall be liable for its satisfaction.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-11 (1980).
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against the Act's goal of promoting equity in marital property
relations. The UMPA's title approach to management and con-
trol leaves a traditionally disadvantaged non-wage-earning
spouse without meaningful ownership of marital property. The
Act does envision that much of the marital property will not be
held in either spouse's name,97 allowing each spouse to manage
it independently.98 The ownership of the most important as-
sets in terms of creditworthiness, however, such as bank ac-
counts or valuable property, is likely to be evidenced by record
title or other customary documents. A spouse without title to
these assets is denied any right of management and control.
The UMPA's mix of community property and title princi-
ples raises the possibility of unusual and inconsistent results.
The Act resembles the Texas system, in which the manage-
ment and control of all community property is determined by
title.99 That system has produced some undesirable results.
For example, the Act allows a spouse to incur an unsecured
debt on the basis of ownership of half the marital property and
section 8(a), which permits obligations to be satisfied from all
the marital property and any individual property of the debtor
spouse. Because the lender in an unsecured credit situation is
seeking only an indication that the debt will be repaid and not
an actual security interest, either spouse should be able to in-
cur the debt if the family has adequate income and the debtor
spouse has access to a joint bank account. The management
and control provisions do not apply because the debtor spouse
is not encumbering any particular piece of marital property.10o
Either spouse could force the other to share in the liability to
the extent of the nondebtor spouse's interest in the marital
property, without notice to or consent of the nondebtor spouse,
subject only to the nebulous limitation that the debt be in-
curred in the family interest. If the proceeds from the un-
secured obligation are then used by the debtor spouse to
purchase an item that has a document of title, which conceiva-
bly could be merely a bill of sale,'O' the nondebtor spouse may
97. See U.M.P.A. §§ 1(9) comment, 5 comment.
98. U.M.P.A. § 5(a) (2).
99. See U.M.P.A. § 5; supra note 66.
100. See U.M.P.A. §§ 1(9), 5. The security interest, if created at all, would
arise only upon default by the debtor and a judicial order creating such an
interest.
101. Where title to personal property or the terms of a sale or mortgage of
personal property are in issue, courts generally have held that a bill of sale or
other similar instrument constitutes the "best evidence" of title. See, e.g., Peo-
ple v. Poindexter, 18 Ill. App. 3d 436, 439, 305 N.E.2d 400, 402 (1973) (citing 32A
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be denied any right in the purchased asset aside from a techni-
cal ownership interest. In such a case, a nondebtor spouse
might question the equity of the Act's proposed changes.
The results are even more questionable in the case of a se-
cured debt. If the creditor requires a particular asset as secur-
ity, only the spouse with title to that property can incur an
obligation without joinder of the other spouse. The spouse
without title to major marital assets and without substantial in-
dividual assets will have no assets available to pledge as secur-
ity. Thus, in a UM,1PA jurisdiction, as in Texas, a non-wage-
earning spouse can effectively be denied the ability to acquire a
secured loan because of the management and control provi-
sions. 0 2 At the same time, that spouse's one-half ownership in-
terest in the marital property can be subject to liability for the
controlling spouse's obligations. Also, as in the case of an un-
secured debt, the nondebtor spouse can be denied important
property rights in any titled proceeds of the obligation. Thus,
the Act may deny a spouse both the ability to incur secured ob-
ligations and the enjoyment of many benefits of ownership of
property purchased by the debtor spouse, yet force the
nondebtor spouse to share the liability for the obligation to the
extent of the marital property.
C. PROTECTIONS FOR NONDEBTOR SPOUSES
The Act does provide three remedies for a spouse's abuse
of property rights: (1) a cause of action for damages for
"breach of the duty of good faith,"103 (2) a right to a judicial ac-
counting of marital property to identify the marital property
and the rights of the respective spouses therein,o 4 and (3) a
right to a court-ordered change in the title to marital prop-
CJ.S. Evidence § 799 (1964)); Wendell Tractor & Implement Co. v. Lee, 9 N.C.
App. 524, 526-27, 176 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1970); cf. Hall v. American Friends Service
Comm., Inc., 79 Wash. 2d 230, 235, 484 P.2d 376 , 378-79 (1971) (en banc) (direct
evidence that plaintiff was the original registered owner of stock certificates
creates a presumption of ownership). Courts have held that extrinsic evidence
cannot be used to contradict that which appears on the face of a bill of sale re-
garding the title or interest conveyed. See, e.g., Allen v. Bryson, 67 Iowa 591,
594-95, 25 N.W. 820, 821-22 (1885).
102. See Bingaman, Equal Management of Community Property and Equal
Credit Opportunity, 13 IDAHo L REV. 161, 161-62 (1977); see also Bingaman, The
Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment on Married Women's Financial Individ-
ual Rights, 3 PEPPERDINE I REv. 26, 32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bingaman,
The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment].
103. U.M.P.A. § 15(a).
104. U.M.P.A. § 15(b).
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erty. 05 The last two remedies are particularly valuable when a
spouse has been denied beneficial rights in marital property.
These remedies, however, have several weaknesses. First, they
are not likely to be used. Most spouses probably would be re-
luctant to resort to court action against their partner unless the
marriage is near its end. Second, the remedies are not preven-
tive. They primarily are useful only after the damage, such as
default on a debt, has occurred. At that point, because the
creditor's interests are protected by the Act,106 the injured
spouse can proceed only against the remaining assets of the
debtor spouse. In cases of default, such a cause of action may
have little value.
The only way spouses can avoid operation of the presump-
tions regarding classification of property and shared liability is
with a marital property agreement. The Act allows spouses to
contract between themselves concerning their respective rights
and obligations in any property. 0 7 The contract, however, will
not prevent creditors without actual knowledge of the agree-
ment from reaching all the marital property10 8 Consequently,
the contract serves only to provide spouses with a cause of ac-
tion against their partners.
IV. AN EVALUATION OF THE UMPA'S SHARING
APPROACH: WEIGHING THE COSTS AND THE
BENEFITS
The UMPA's sharing approach proposes some much
needed changes in marital property law. Sharing property
ownership gives both spouses credit for their contributions to
the marriage and recognizes that each spouse benefits from the
efforts of the other.1 0 9 Some of the effects of the forced sharing
of liabilities also would be desirable. In particular, the
creditworthiness of non-wage-earning spouses would increase
105. U.M.P.A. § 15(c).
106. Protections for creditors provided by the UMPA include the freedom to
rely on indicia of title in deciding whether to extend credit, the presumption
that all marital property is available to satisfy a default judgment, the freedom
from the terms of a marital property agreement unless given actual notice, and
the protection from court-ordered changes in title to marital property as be-
tween spouses. See U.M.P.A. §§ 5 comment, 8(a), 8(b) (ii), 8(e), 15(c) (4).
107. See U.M.P.A. § 10.
108. U.M.P.A. § 8(e).
109. Because of its sharing approach, the UMPA has received support
across the political spectrum. See Wenig, supra note 16, at 9. Supporters of the
sharing approach include The National Organization for Women, William F.
Buckley, Jr., Phyllis Schlafly, The League of Women Voters of Wisconsin, The
Older Women's League, and the 1980 White House Conference on Families.
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significantly11 0 because they would be able to secure credit on
the basis of their spouse's income. Thus, the Act would give a
homemaker spouse the ability to acquire credit, limited only by
the other spouse's management and control powers over mari-
tal property."'
Although the forced sharing of ownership clearly is desira-
ble, the wisdom of the forced sharing of debts is less clear. The
potential for abuse in the forced sharing of ownership of mari-
tal property is minimal and easily identifiable. Sharing owner-
ship is inequitable only when one spouse decides to take
advantage of the provision and get something for nothing by
ceasing to contribute to the maintenance of the marriage. This
generally would be readily apparent to the injured spouse, who
could take steps to remedy the situation. When debt liability is
shared, however, abuse by one spouse almost necessarily
would involve third parties. The injured spouse may be un-
aware of the abuse until the obligation is incurred, when any
available remedy against the offending spouse may be of little
practical value, particularly if the offending spouse is in default
on the obligations.112 Moreover, the rights of third parties may
take precedence over any rights the nondebtor spouse might
have. Consequently, even in harmonious marriages, spouses
might feel the need to be constantly wary, even suspicious, of
the activities of their marital partners.
The UA4PA does not provide adequate protections when
marriages do encounter the problems identified in this Note.
The Act's sharing approach to debt liability is justified only if
the interests promoted by the change and the costs of prevent-
ing abuses outweigh the potential risks of abuse. A sharing ap-
proach for marital debts promotes two basic sets of interests:
(1) the reasonable expectations of marital partners, and
(2) commercial practicality and the interests of creditors.
Neither set of interests, however, is sufficiently enhanced by
forced sharing of liability to justify the risks to spouses.
First, it is not clear that the reasonable expectations of
spouses are met by a system that subjects a spouse's property
interest to debt liability without notice and consent. Propo-
nents of the sharing approach, however, argue that it better ap-
proximates the real expectations of spouses than the common
110. Cf. Binganan, The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment, supra note
102, at 31-32 (equal management provisions in some community property states
allow a spouse to acquire credit on the basis of the other spouse's income).
111. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
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law title approach.113 These commentators believe that
spouses typically perceive that all marital assets are part of a
common pool to which each spouse can gain complete and
equal access, even when one spouse is delegated the responsi-
bility of managing the assets. The sharing approach thus con-
forms more closely to this perception than does the common
law.114
This perception is questionable at best. The modern insti-
tution of marriage has been changing so drastically in recent
years that it is debatable whether any typical marital situation
or set of expectations can be identified."5 The traditional mari-
tal property scheme has been supplanted in many instances by
separate bank accounts, marital contracts, and dual career fam-
ilies. These developments undoubtedly have increased the va-
riety of expectations spouses hold about their marital property
rights.
Even in the "traditional" marriage it is not clear that the
forced sharing of liabilities conforms to the spouses' reasonable
expectations. Although spouses might expect to share property
and income and to be able freely to use all joint property, it is
also likely that spouses expect their partners to consult with
them before incurring debts. Spouses probably do not antici-
pate that their partners are able to incur major obligations
without their knowledge or consent. It is even less likely that
spouses expect to be forced to give up their marital property to
satisfy such obligations. People expect the law to protect them
from the misconduct of others, including .their spouses. A
113. See Greene, supra note 18, at 91; Kahn-Freund, supra note 21, at 135-36;
Quinn, supra note 3, at 50, col. 1.
114. See Quinn, supra note 3, at 50, col. 1.
115. There are numerous indicators of this change. In 1930, one in every six
marriages ended in divorce. Today, the figure is one in two. Cantwell, supra
note 18, at 4, citing 5 MARRIAGE & DIVORCE TODAY 34 (Apr. 7, 1980). In 1963 the
median marriage duration was 7.5 years; now it is 6.6 years. Cantwell, supra
note 18, at 4-5, citing 4 MARRIAGE & DIVORCE TODAY 44 (June 18, 1979). The me-
dian age of individuals at their first marriage is rising. Libby, Creative Sin-
glehood as a Sexual Life-Style. Beyond Marriage as a Rite of Passage, in
MARRIAGE AND ALTERNATIVES: EXPLORING INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 42 (Libby &
Whitehurst eds. 1977). The size of families is shrinking; the birth rate has
dropped below that required for population maintenance. C. BiRD, THE Two-
PAYCHECK MARRIAGE 12 (1979). In addition to demographic changes, the eco-
nomics of marriage are changing. Only seventeen percent of American mar-
riages fit the traditional pattern of the husband as breadwinner and the wife as
homemaker. Friedan, Feminism Takes a New Turn, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1979,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 92. Over fifty percent of all married women work outside the
home. Norwood, New Approaches to Statistics on the Family, 100 MONTHLY
LAB. REv. 31, 34 (July 1977).
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cause of action against a bankrupt spouse is not the protection
they expect. Because this remedy is all the Act may provide in
many situations, it is not clear that forced sharing of debt liabil-
ity effectively fulfills the expectations of spouses.
It is also unclear whether the interests of creditors are pro-
moted by forced sharing of liability and, if so, whether those in-
terests outweigh the substantial risks to unknowing spouses.
The presumption of a family purpose and the management and
control system may reduce the burdens of inquiry and the risk
to creditors. The presumption maximizes the amount of assets
available to satisfy debt liability. The title-based management
and control system allows creditors generally to ignore the
ownership changes proposed by the Act and to carry on busi-
ness as usual.116 In many situations, then, these provisions do
protect the interests of creditors in dealings with married
persons.
These provisions do not protect the creditor, and may even
hinder the creditor's attempts at self-protection, however, when
all or most of the marital property is held in a manner that per-
mits both spouses independently to manage and control it. In
that situation, when a marital debt is incurred by one spouse
without the knowledge or consent of the other, the creditor can
rely on the entire marital property and on the Act's presump-
tion of a family purpose in extending credit. Nothing prevents
the nondebtor spouse, however, from consuming or disposing
of large portions of the marital property to the detriment of the
creditor's interests.
A prudent creditor in this situation would seek protection
from that risk by requiring joinder. In a UMPA jurisdiction,
however, such a requirement might violate federal law. Regula-
tions promulgated under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act'17
prohibit a creditor in a community property state from requir-
ing the signature of the noncontracting spouse, unless the
spouse seeking credit, under state law, does not control enough
community property and does not own enough separate prop-
erty to qualify for the amount of credit sought.11 8 If the spouse
116. See Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-spousal
Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L REV. 20, 45-47 (1967). Vaughn argues that a restric-
tive management and control system saves the community property approach
from being inconvenient for business transactions.
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1983).
118. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d) (3) (1980); see also
Crapo, Equal Management of Community Property: Creditors' Rights. 13 IDAHO
L. REV. 177 (1977); Johnson, Limitations on Creditors' Rights to Require
Spouses' Signatures Under the ECOA and Washington Community Property
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seeking credit has power over enough marital property, the
lender cannot require joinder. Since the Act parallels the man-
agement and control provisions of community property law,
this prohibition probably would apply in any UMPA jurisdic-
tion. Thus, under the UMPA, the ability of cautious creditors to
protect their security interests might be severely limited.
Even if the Act's shared liability provisions protect credi-
tors' interests, it is not clear that those interests outweigh the
substantial interest in protecting the nondebtor spouse. The
unknowing spouse often will be the person least able to pre-
vent harm, whereas the creditor will be the most able. Placing
the burden of preventing imprudent debts on the nondebtor
spouse imposes a duty on that spouse of constant oversight of
the potential debtor spouse's actions. On the other hand, credi-
tors can protect both their own interests and those of the
nondebtor spouse. Creditors generally will have greater re-
sources and business knowledge than the nondebtor spouse.
Furthermore, creditors need make an inquiry only at the time
the debt is sought; constant oversight is not necessary. More
importantly, because creditors are the ultimate source of the li-
ability, they can prevent injury and abuse by requiring joinder,
or by limiting or even denying credit in questionable cases.
Oddly enough, the one person with no right to notice or
consent is the only person to have property affected by the
UMPA's characterization of a debt. Under both the Act and the
common law, if a spouse incurs an obligation individually both
the individual property and the debtor spouse's interest in con-
currently held property" 9 are liable. The only effect of the
Act's forced sharing provisions is to subject the nondebtor
spouse's concurrently held property interest to liability.120 Yet
the nondebtor spouse has no right to notice or consent regard-
ing the characterization of the transaction and must overcome
a presumption to avoid liability. Since debtor spouses are free
to obligate all their interests in property, both individual and
marital, it would be a better policy to give nondebtor spouses a
right to notice, probably through a joinder requirement, when
Law, 4 U. PUGET SouND L. REV. 333 (1981); Taylor, The Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act's Spousal Cosignature Rules and Community Property States: Regula-
tory Haywire, 37 Sw. UJ. 1039 (1984).
119. Concurrently held property at common law could be property held in a
joint tenancy, a tenancy in common, or a tenancy by the entirety. See supra
notes 29-35 and accompanying text. According to the UMPA, concurrently held
property is marital property.
120. See U.M.P.A. § 8(b) (IV).
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the characterization of the obligation adversely affects their
property.
V. TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE MARITAL
PROPERTY LAW
The interests promoted by the UMPA's liability sharing
provision do not justify its enactment. Not only is forced shar-
ing of debts by spouses not in itself a positive change, it ne-
gates the potential value of other UMPA provisions. A better
approach for legislatures considering adoption of the Act would
be to accept the Act's forced sharing approach only for owner-
ship of marital property. The common law treatment of debts
is preferable. Individual spouses should be able to obligate
only their individual property and their one-half interest in
marital property without joinder of the other spouse.
This suggested approach has several implications. It effec-
tively eliminates the Act's family purpose doctrine.12 1 The
forced sharing of debts provision' 22 would also have to be re-
placed by a provision creating liability for all marital property
only if both spouses join in the obligation. As broadly as the
family purpose doctrine has been construed in community
property states,m3 its elimination does not erode protections for
the nondebtor spouse, and the joinder requirement adds a truly
concrete protection. 124 This approach would require spouses
seeking to obligate marital property either to join their spouse
in the obligation or demonstrate to creditors that the requested
debt does not exceed half the marital assets plus the debtor
spouse's individual assets. This burden, however, is not unduly
onerous, since it is required now in common law states,125 and
therefore is unlikely to disrupt the normal functioning of the
family. The suggested approach also diminishes the need for
the Act's management and control provisions. Title to marital
property would not give a spouse the power individually to en-
cumber the property when it composes more than half of the
total marital assets. Creditors thus could not rely on title in ex-
tending credit. Consequently, the title-based management and
control provisions could be eliminated altogether, since the
chief remaining purpose they would serve would be to deprive
121. U.M.P.A. § 8; see supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
122. UA.P.A. § 8(b) (ii).
123. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
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nontitled spouses of many of the benefits of ownership of the
marital property.126 This would better fulfill the Act's primary
purpose of providing both spouses with a meaningful present
interest in the marital assets, a purpose that largely is contra-
vened by the Act's approach to management and control.
The changes suggested by this Note present several advan-
tages over current UMPA provisions. First, these changes
sever the unnecessary link between forced sharing of marital
property and forced sharing of debts.127 The equity promoted
by forced sharing of ownership in marital property does not
justify forced debt sharing. The unfairness of the common law
property system lies not in its failure to force spouses to share
in the debts incurred by their partners, but in its failure to rec-
ognize the nonmonetary contributions of spouses to marital ac-
quisitions. 2 8 Forced debt sharing and forced income sharing
proceed from separate and distinct policy considerations. The
proposed changes make this separation clear; the right to own-
ership in marital property is treated apart from debt liability.
These changes also better promote the interests of credi-
tors. The proposed changes essentially impose the common
law approach to debt and credit, with the important distinction
that creditors will be unable to rely solely on documents of title
to establish creditworthiness. Instead, they will have to require
other safeguards to ensure that spouses are not trying to en-
cumber more than half of the marital property. Creditors prob-
ably will require joinder. Importantly, though, with these
changes creditors will be able to require joinder without violat-
ing the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Under ECOA regula-
tions, state law determines whether a lender can require
joinder. 2 9 Since state law, with the changes proposed here,
would require joinder to attach liability to all the marital as-
sets, the lender would be protected. Moreoever, when one
spouse does obtain a debt on the security of marital property,
126. Id.
127. Forced income sharing rests on beliefs that nonmonetary contributions
of spouses to the marriage deserve recognition, and that each spouse contrib-
utes equally to the marriage. Acceptance of these propositions does not neces-
sarily require accepting the proposition that spouses should share
responsibility for debts incurred by their partners despite the lack of opportu-
nity effectively to object to the debts. The latter proposition primarily rests on
considerations of ease to the parties to the debt transaction, not on the protec-
tion of the interests of both spouses.
128. See Greene, supra note 18, at 83; see generally W. DE FUNIAK & M.
VAUGHN, supra note 41, at §§ 2, 11.1; Kahn-Freund, supra note 21, at 133-36.
129. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d) (3) (1980).
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the creditor's interest is more secure from disposition of the as-
sets by the nondebtor spouse because the creditor may rely
only upon the debtor spouse's interest.
The final and most important advantage of the changes to
the Act proposed in this Note is that they better fulfill spouses'
expectations of safeguards from abuses and mismanagement of
marital property. These changes make it more difficult for
spouses to encumber marital property without the knowledge
of their partners. With notice prior to the debt and the power
to limit liability to the debtor spouse's marital property,
nondebtor spouses are in a better position to avoid injury and
presumably will have a more meaningful remedy after an in-
jury occurs. This is a much more valuable protection than an
after-the-fact court action against one's spouse.
VL CONCLUSION
This Note has presented a critical analysis of the UMPA
and a number of the significant changes it proposes for com-
mon law states. Although recognizing the strengths of the Act,
this Note has attempted to identify potential problems with its
approach to the property relations between spouses. The
problems arise primarily in the Act's forced debt sharing provi-
sion and its lack of safeguards from abuse. The Note proposes
that legislatures considering the UMPA adopt the forced shar-
ing of ownership approach but reject the forced debt sharing
provisions in favor of a limited liability approach. The Act of-
fers much in the way of increased equality of property rights
between spouses, and with the suggested changes these rights
can be protected.
Keith D. Ross
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